And now, do you understand? – Express

The crisis of the presidency of the Assembly of the Republic was announced: the AD won by millimeters; the moderate right bloc was behind the left in terms of deputies; and this minimal margin brought two news to Montenegro. The good thing was to exempt him from leaving the scene, guaranteeing him the appointment as prime minister; The bad thing is that, by guaranteeing him the Government, it did not guarantee him being able to govern.

In practice, in the early hours of March 11, Luís Montenegro was left with only two options: govern with Chega’s favorable votes (which would force him to refuse his most important electoral promise) or negotiating PS abstention. Not once by exception, not just in the Government Program, nor just in the budgets, but in every vote that takes place in the Assembly of the Republic. One by one.

Until this Tuesday, the prime minister-designate trusted that he could survive on the wire: it would be possible, he believed, to alternate between Chega and PS, negotiating diploma by diploma and assuming fundamental decisions in the Government. As we wrote here in Expresso, the idea seemed simple: in everything that was not a reserve of Assembly powers, the Government would approve the laws in the Council of Ministers, hoping that PS and Chega would not come to an agreement in Parliament for their repeal or amendment. It was running away and challenging, the old-fashioned way, like Guterres did in the 90s, like Sócrates did (more difficultly) when he lost his majority.

This Tuesday, on day 1 of the new Parliament, Montenegro will have realized that politics is no longer like it used to be and that Chega does not accept playing with these rules. What happened however – an agreement with Pedro Nuno Santos and no meeting with Ventura – was not a choice, it was the recognition of an error of evaluation. From now on, nothing will be the same and the chances are that we will have elections just around the corner (which may well solve nothing or make the case worse).

André Ventura warned right on election night: with 50 deputies, he would require a political agreement with Luís Montenegro to ensure governability. He even gave the PSD a deadline until the summer, but he didn’t even give it a day. There are no reasons for any surprises: “In any context, the best way for the radical right to pressure the right mainstream To be accepted as a partner in an agreement is to show that the country is ungovernable without that agreement.”, wrote political scientist Pedro Magalhães early in the morning. The scientific literature confirms: populist parties do not accept small gains, nor do they act in search of progressive integration into the political system they contest. The blocking of institutions is also not new: “The radical right, both contemporary and historically, has contributed to the erosion of established norms in the functioning of parliaments”, recalled Vicente Valentim, author of a new book about the consequences of the normalization of the radical right, referring to a study by Isabela Mares.

Listening to André Ventura, his steps are predictable, because he himself enunciates them: despite the zigzags, omissions and illusions, Chega wants to force the PSD to choose between “no yes” or an agreement with the socialists. In both cases, Chega can win: or enters power (and many studies show how the radical right gains from this normalization); or gain space as the sole opponent of the regime. If it enters, it will force a tremendously unpopular retreat on Montenegro (because it breaks a central promise and because its own electorate did not want it); If you are left out, you will capitalize on your exclusion until the next elections. Legitimately, because he has always assumed it and had votes like that, Ventura is the politician who encourages instability and drinks from it – until the day he is integrated or he wins elections.

It has now become clear that it is not possible to expect Ventura to accept playing outside, to accept playing by the other parties’ rules. Perhaps it was even clear to those on the right who were arguing that “no is no” only served for governance agreements and excluded diploma-by-diploma, budget-by-budget negotiations. With Chega it really is all or nothing – and everything indicates that this is why 1.2 million Portuguese voted for the party.

But what’s coming is worse: as José Matos Correia, former chief of staff of a prime minister and former leader of the PSD, warns in this article, the idea of ​​surviving week to week, day to day, taking decisions in the Council of Ministers may have a very short leg: 10 deputies are enough to call Government decrees to Parliament and, in many cases, a simple majority is enough to change or revoke them. AND Anyone who expects Chega not to vote with the left is wrong.: neither Chega is exactly right-wing on many issues, nor will it have any qualms about abstaining to hold Montenegro responsible for the lack of an agreement (and one abstention in each vote is enough). This has now become clear, “radicalism and populism, beyond everything else, have no say. They leave things unsaid like someone changing their shirt”, concludes Matos Correia, warning of “the most challenging legislature in almost three decades” of democracy, “at least”.

In the first hour, in the first crisis of the legislature, the designated prime minister was forced to negotiate with Pedro Nuno Santos, sharing the presidency of Parliament with the PS. To the most unwary, I must say that It’s just the beginning: the PSD will have to rely on the PS many more times in the coming monthsso that there is a Government Program, a Rectification, the promised bonuses for police, military, health professionals and teachers (who need to agree on the details), and even the PRR reforms promised to Brussels, which bring checks in return.

Now that it is clear what Ventura is coming to, PSD and PS only two options remain: either they survive in six months and prepare for the next elections – which will come with Chega acting as an excluded victim of the regime –, or they sit down and make a long-term agreement that guarantees them time to implement a plan that really rethinks (and convince) the country.

Impossible? Very well, do the math: Marcelo can only dissolve on September 10th, the elections will be in November. Cross your fingers: it will be eight months with Ventura clamoring against a Central Bloc, with no time for Montenegro or Pedro Nuno to win over sympathies.

This week’s Minority Watch ends here. If you have questions, comments or even criticism, send me an email at [email protected]